an e na	Аррі	roved For Release 2009/03/11	: : CIA-RDP82-00457F	R010300030007-1	OC4	D 27
		CLASSIFICATION CONFIDEN	7404 racı - v.s. c	FFICIALS CULY		25X1
		CENTRAL INTELLIGE	NCE AGENCY	REPORT		
	INTELLOFAX 14	INFORMATION	REPORT	CD NO.		
				35 110 .		
COUNTRY	Czechoslo	ovakia		DATE DISTR.	8 Feb.	1952
SUBJECT	Rudolf S]	ansky's Arrest		NO. OF PAGES	3	
PLACE		The state of the s		NO OF ENOISE		
ACQUIRE	D		ATE	NO. OF ENCLS.		25X1
DATE OF		TOM	CIRCULATE	SUPPLEMENT T	n	20/(1
INFO.		10 Hor	To the second se	REPORT NO.	•	
		·				
THIS DOCUME OF THE UNITE AND 794, OF ATION OF 178 IS PROHIBITED	THE W. S. CODE, AS AME CONTENTS TO OR RECE	N AFFECTIVE THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RATING OF TITLE 15, SECTIONS 799 NOCE. IT TRANSMISSION OR REVEL-19T BY AN URAUTHORIZED PERCONDUCTION OF THIS FORM IS FROMINITED.	THIS IS UNEVA	LUATED INFORMA	TION	25X1 [°]
	upo	23 November 1951, had on by the Politburo of Omposed of Klement Got	f the Czechoslo	vak Communis	t Party	25X1

Siroky, Dr. Jaromir Dolansky, Karol Bacilek, and Dr. Alexej Cepicka). Kolomon Mosko and Jan Pull, in charge of reorganizing the Slovak Communist Party, testified before the Politburo about dangerous developments in Slovakia, where dissatisfaction with Prague and the Central Czechoslovak Government led to subversive agitation for Slovakia to join the Soviet Union directly as an independent Soviet Federal Republic. Slansky and his friends were held responsible for this subversive agitation.

On 24 November 1951, Dr. Zdenek Nejedly, Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences, Member of the Praesidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and at present the Czech Communist most trusted in Moscow, was asked by Klement Gottwald immediately to inform Anatol Lavrantiev, the new Soviet Ambassador to Prague, about the intention of the Czechoslovak Government to arrest Slansky. Nejedly was also asked to point out to Lavrantiev the absolute necessity of bringing all kinds of subversive agitation in Czechoglovakia, however intentioned, to an immediate end, as such agitation would soon lead to the destruction of the trust and friendship of the Czech people for Stalin and the Soviet Union. In the light of such dangerous possibilities, the Czechoslovak Government stated that it could no longer tolerate Slansky's personal activities and ambitions.

After long and repeated consultations with Valerian Zorin, (the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Aremlin's supervisor for Czechoslovak affairs), Lavrantiev announced to Nejedly on 26 November 1951 that the Soviet Government, 25 YEAR RE-REVIEW the greatest reluctance took note of the intention

				C	LAS	SSIFICAT	ION	CONFID	Fy	COMBOL -	n,s.	OF F	r <u>o</u> j	TALS ONLY	, i		
STATE	EE	E٦	NAVY	1	X	NSRB				UTION							
ARMY		X	AIR		X	FBI	7							DETUN	_		
							genetes annum	Carrier and the same district vision of		deng sengah dan melalapida Personal pelalapinan melalapida (senamban melalapida).				KETTRI IMMES	V TI Dia:	b records Tely afte	CENTE R 115
														JOB	3	BOX 5	

25X1

CONTINUATION OF U. A OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

-2

of the Czechoslovak Government to end the crisis of the Czechoslovak Communist Party by arresting Deputy Prime Minister Rudolf Slansky. The Politburo of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was advised to proceed in that case with the greatest care and prudence.

- 4. At the insistence of Dr. Alexej Cepicka, Minister of Defense, (and the son-in-law of Klement Gottwald) the arrest of Slansky, who had already been held in confinement for several days, was publicly announced early on the morning of 27 November 1951.
- 5. Great uncertainty is now reigning in leading Communist circles in Prague as a result of Slansky's arrest because of the lack of precise information about the Soviet attitude toward the crisis in the Czechoslovak Communist Party, and especially about the real Soviet intentions in that matter. Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky gave assurances about the Soviet consent to Slansky's arrest, but in some government circles fear is being expressed that the struggle between the Gottwald-Zapotocky group and the followers of Slamsky may, at any time, be used as a pretext by the Soviets to restore order in Czechoslovakia in the manner most suitable to them.
- 6. Above all, doubts are being expressed openly about the psychological effect of Slansky's arrest on the working class in Czechoslovakia, already disappointed with the government's decision (Nov. 20, 1951) not to grant the traditional Christmas allowance (2-4 weeks' salary) this year. The workers are not in a mood to accept Slansky's arrest as a compensation for that loss, although Slansky as a dictator and a Jew has not been popular with them.
- 7. On the surface it would seem that the present Czechoslovak Communist leaders, Gottwald and Zapotocky, have by Slansky's arrest concentrated all governmental power in a few reliable hands. Well-informed Czechoslovak Communist circles, however, do not expect that this very risky action against Slansky will gain for them the support of the working class (already confused by Dr. Vlado Clementis' arrest in February, 1951, and skeptical of all the purges since) and will not lessen the silent but uncompromising opposition to them by the bourgeosie, the Catholic Church and the peasantry. The same circles are also convinced that the effect of Slansky's arrest will not help Zapotocky's drive to raise production, on which his government's political future, from the Soviet point of view, exclusively depends. Instead, they believe that the economic difficulties now prevailing in Czechoslovakia, and the confusion in the Party resulting from the many internal quarrels, will produce apathy and depression among the workers. New and even greater dangers to the Gottwald-Zapotocky leadership than those produced by Slansky's intrigues may thus be expected.
- 8. There is an almost general fear in Prague that Slansky's arrest will not solve the problem of Slovak Separatism either (or stop the further blackmailing of the Central Government by Slansky's strongest Slovak exponent, Stefan Bastovansky). Bastovansky, of Hungarian origin, is still a member of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party and is proposing

CONTINENTACINOL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

25X1

CONSTRUCTION TROL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25X1

∞3∞

the annexation of Slovakia by the Soviet Union as the only means to avoid an open revolt there. In addition to Bastovansky, Prague also knows that Zdenek Fierlinger, Deputy Prime Minister and a member of the Praesidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, known as a regular informer of the Soviet Legation in Prague, is a supporter of the idea of complete absorption of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union as an independent Soviet Federal Republic. New intrigues from both Bastovansky and Fierlinger are thus expected in Prague; however, it is believed that the Soviet Government possibly does not feel that the time is yet ripe for the immediate total Sovietization of Czechoslovakia. Some time is still needed before total absorption can be achieved. It is assumed in Prague that Slansky's arrest, and probably his trial, will be tolerated for the time being by the Soviet Government, suffering itself from deep internal divisions, which result in its having no consistent policy toward the Satellites.

- 9. In case the present tension in Czechoslovakia is aggravated, it is generally believed in Prague that Gottwald, one of the founders of the Cominform and a disciple of Lenin, will not dare to risk open conflict with the Kremlin. Even his closest friends are convinced that at the culmination of the struggle, he will finally submit himself and his government unconditionally to Stalin's orders as he did in 1947 when he first accepted Marshall Plan aid and later refused it as a result of Soviet intervention.
- 10. Nevertheless, Communist economists in Prague admit that should the international tension in Europe diminish during 1952, the Soviets may use to their benefit the prestige gained in the West by the Czechoslovak President Klement Gottwald, who courageously removed Slansky, an arrogant representative of aggressive international Communism. Gottwald could then be used in eventual economic negotiations for the revival of trade between East and West. This belief, however, is not shared by old members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who do not consider Slansky's arrest as only an episode in the internal struggles of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, but as an event of European significance which will soon involve the future fate of Czechoslovakia and probably all the Soviet satellites. Without regard to the situation now existing in Yugoslavia, they consider Gottwald's victory as a temporary success that cannot endure. These experienced Communists accept the authorization of Gottwald's action against Slansky as a sign of growing unrest in the satellite countries. Under pressure the Soviets had to modify their policy toward the satellites. But this pressure may soon force the .Soviet Government to decide, either in favor of complete absorption of the satellites by the Soviet Union, or in favor of a fundamental relaxation of the ties which bind them today to the Soviets and are endangering their whole existence. Slansky's arrest points to the urgency of such a decision, which cannot be avoided for long.

CONSTRUCTION OF U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY